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Conversion disorder (‘hysteria’) was largely considered to be a neurological problem in the 19th century, but without a
neuropathological explanation it was commonly assimilated with malingering. The theories of Janet and Freud transformed
hysteria into a psychiatric condition, but as such models decline in popularity and a neurobiology of conversion has yet to be
found, today’s neurologists once again face a disorder without an accepted model. This article explores how today’s neurologists
understand conversion through in-depth interviews with 22 neurology consultants. The neurologists endorsed psychological
models but did not understand their patients in such terms. Rather, they distinguished conversion from other unexplained
conditions clinically by its severity and inconsistency. While many did not see this as clearly distinct from feigning, they did
not feel that this was their problem to resolve. They saw themselves as ‘agnostic’ regarding non-neuropathological explanations.
However, since neurologists are in some ways more expert in conversion than psychiatrists, their continuing support for the
deception model is important, and begs an explanation. One reason for the model’s persistence may be that it is employed as
a diagnostic device, used to differentiate between those unexplained symptoms that could, in principle, have a medical
explanation and those that could not.
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The problem of hysteria
Neurologists, like all clinicians, see many patients whose symptoms
are medically unexplained. In the UK such patients comprise
some 30–60% of neurological outpatients (Carson et al., 2000;
Nimnuan et al., 2001). However, this mass of symptoms may not
all be ‘unexplained’ in the same way. While some may be
unexplained because they are at the limits of knowledge, there
are others where doctors are inclined to infer explanations, but not
physiological ones. Hysteria is (or was) one of the latter. But why
should this be the case, and on what grounds?
Though hysteria was ‘re-medicalized’ during the Renaissance,
after many years in which it was treated as a religious phenom-
enon (Micale, 1995), doctors still found it to be different.
Seventeenth-century physicians such as Thomas Sydenham were
struck that it seemed to be brought on by emotion (Veith, 1993),
and by the 19th century it was widely agreed that hysteria could
be caused and cured by psychosocial factors, as reported for
example, by Robert Carter (Carter, 1853), Silas Weir Mitchell
(Mitchell, 1885) and Jean-Martin Charcot (Charcot, 1889).
Furthermore, it did not ﬁt with the mechanics afforded by the
19th century advances in neuroanatomy and neurophysiology,
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conscious or unconscious behaviour. Both Carter and Weir
Mitchell saw conscious deception as being the mechanism of the
later stages of hysteria but Charcot resisted this inference, even
though it had been his clinical-anatomic method which had shown
the absence of explanatory lesions in the brains of hysterics. He
insisted that a ‘functional’ lesion would be found when microscopes
were sufﬁciently powerful, and offered the ﬁrst systematic psycho-
logical theory of hysteria, as hypnosis, until that time (Shorter,
1992). Although his theory did not survive his death, his great
achievement, according to Freud, ‘was to restore dignity to the
topic. Little by little, people gave up the scornful smile with
which the patient could at that time feel certain of being met.
She was no longer necessarily a malingerer, for Charcot had
thrown the whole weight of his authority on the side of the gen-
uineness and objectivity of hysterical phenomena.’ (Freud, 1953)
Charcot’s theory was rapidly supplanted by the more resilient
theories of his students, Pierre Janet (dissociation) and Sigmund
Freud (conversion). Since then hysteria has been considered a
psychiatric disorder, and the problem of diagnosis properly one
for psychiatrists. And although ‘Hysteria’ is no longer used in
the psychiatric manuals, the psychological concepts associated
with it still are. The diagnostic schema ICD-10 (WHO, 1992)
and DSM-IV (APA, 1994) employ the categories of ‘Dissociative
(Conversion) Disorder’ and ‘Conversion Disorder’, respectively, to
describe motor and sensory symptoms that lack a neurological
explanation, which are not feigned and where a psychosocial
explanation can be demonstrated. However, the requirement for
such an explanation is a problem for psychiatrists as the Freudian
orthodoxy declines, and the hope of a neuropsychological alter-
native remains unfulﬁlled (Kozlowska, 2005). The diagnostic crite-
ria are now widely considered unreliable or invalid (Wessely,
2001), and the psychiatric community is searching for a way to
replace them (Mayou et al., 2005).
But there is no getting away from the extent to which neuro-
logists, in the UK at least, are those who sit ‘in the psychiatrist’s
chair’. Neurologists are still largely the ones who manage conver-
sion, who make the psychiatric referrals, who have that ﬁrst
difﬁcult conversation—and they do not ﬁnd that position comfort-
able (Carson et al., 2004; Hallett, 2006). Faced with a condition
that still resists neuropathological explanation, with fading hope of
a psychiatric explanation, do they once again assimilate it with
malingering? When perhaps the majority of their patients’ symp-
toms are to some extent unexplained, on what basis do they
single out a special ‘conversion’ group? We set out to explore
neurologists’ beliefs about the condition they think of as ‘conver-
sion disorder’ through a series of in-depth interviews: what do
they think it is, what do they think it is not, and why.
Interviewing neurologists
We approached all practising consultant neurologists (doctors who
had completed all neurology training, and were included on the
specialist neurology register) in a large NHS region, and sought
further recruitment by snowball sampling—participants were asked
to nominate a neurologist whose views were different to their
own—until the interviews stopped yielding new views (known as
thematic saturation) (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). R.K. interviewed
the neurologists at a time and place of their choosing, the
interview taking between 35 and 70min. These were ‘depth
interviews’ which employed a topic guide to provide a bare
structure, with the material covered adapted to each interview.
The subject was ‘conversion disorder’ and no deﬁnition of this
was offered by the interviewer. The topics included the neurolo-
gist’s background, training and current practice, examples of
memorable or current patients considered to have ‘conversion
disorder’, the neurologist’s deﬁnitions, exclusions, models and
diagnostic practices. Interviews were digitally audio-recorded and
transcribed, and were inductively analysed using NVIVO 7
software. Transcripts were coded by question, and, iteratively,
by emerging themes, consistent with an approach known as
grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). The study was
approved by the local research ethics committee, and all the
participants gave written, informed consent.
Twenty-two neurologists were interviewed, from a potential
pool of 35 in the region. Their ages ranged from 39 to
63 years, with a median age of 45. Seven were female, 15
were male. Seventeen were white, two were from the Middle
East and three from the Indian subcontinent. They had been
medically qualiﬁed for 14–39 years (median 20 years), received
their medical training in the UK (15), other developed countries
(ﬁve) and the Indian subcontinent (two). Two had been mature
medical students. Five had worked as psychiatrists earlier in their
training (for between 6 weeks and 3 years), eight had worked on
a national neuropsychiatry service (as neurologists) and two had
pursued research in psychiatry. In terms of current work, all were
attached to a regional neuroscience centre in London, with most
working in district general hospitals in other counties for the bulk
of their practice. Three held academic appointments, but all with
substantial clinical commitments. All were ‘general’ neurologists,
except for one who saw only headache, one who worked only
with movement disorders and three who worked largely or
exclusively with epilepsy.
What is conversion disorder?
All those interviewed recognized the concept of ‘conversion
disorder’. Many reported pre-clinical exposure to conversion
disorder or a condition they considered similar—seven had recog-
nized it in family members, one in a friend and one in their youn-
ger self. All but ﬁve said they saw conversion commonly in their
work—constituting up to 20% of their workload. One reported
seeing it less commonly than earlier in their training, two felt that
it was now uncommon, and one that it was rare to see it ‘in its
severe form’ (S06). One reported not seeing it at all, and
wondered whether it still existed.
The neurologists revealed a wide range of views on the nature
of conversion disorder. Their deﬁnitions incorporated both physical
and psychological elements, but felt only the physical was their
area of expertise. Physically, they saw it as a more severe con-
dition than other neurologically unexplained symptoms. They
thought it to have a psychological basis, though the precise
nature of that was felt to be something for psychiatrists rather
than neurologists. The issue of conscious feigning (usually
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views, but the neurologists were evenly divided as to whether this
was a factor in the presentation of conversion disorder. Those who
thought it was not often did so on the basis of clinical conviction
or because they found the alternative unbearable. Others, how-
ever, had views which clearly accommodated feigning, and some
were unapologetic in their suspicions.
Clinical distinctions
The neurologists reported that they often had an inkling that an
organic explanation for the patients’ symptoms would not be
found within the ﬁrst few minutes of the clinical encounter.
...you usually have a fairly good instinct fairly early on as to
whether this is going to turn out to be anything...(S16)
...you often have a feeling...when you ﬁrst see people in
clinic that you may not identify the structural cause for their
problem. (S21)
This did not lead to skimping on the examination or investigations,
however, where conﬁrmation was sought. They described an
accumulation of indicators that required caution in interpretation:
caution, because there were few certainties, because the ‘positive
signs’ of conversion were unreliable, and because there were
invariably cases that proved to be organic despite negative tests
and a suggestive examination. They relied most heavily on
evidence of inconsistency—either passively observed, or actively
induced by ‘tricks’:
There are certain things that lead you to believe that this
is psychogenic...but they are not totally reliable...and so I
tend to do things that are more conﬁrmatory...which is really
to trick the patient into...doing things they don’t believe they
can do...for example, if they’re completely paralysed and you
can distract them into having a normal gait...(S22)
I’ve got other ways of ﬁnding out whether their weakness is real
or not...inconsistencies between functional assessment and
formal testing...their ability to walk or get out of a chair,
with apparently no power when you actually formally test
them on the bed - that sort of inconsistency. (S13)
These signs were used to differentiate conversion, not only from
organic neurology, but also from other unexplained symptoms.
There, the distinction was between unexplained symptoms for
which the doctor believed a neuropathological explanation could,
in principle, be found, and unexplained symptoms where no such
explanation seemed possible even in principle, since the ‘trick’
had revealed something that contradicted accepted physiology:
I got [a patient with apparent paraparesis] out of his chair and
said, ‘‘Let’s go for a run; you may be able to run but you can’t
walk’’. And we ran up and down the ward together...That
worked...it was a trick...(S10)
Whereas other unexplained symptoms, though they didn’t quite
‘add up’ to a particular disorder, still seemed to suggest organicity
even though the test to prove that was not available or not
warranted:
We all get thrown by the patient in outpatients who comes
along with some weird symptoms that don’t make sense and
they’ve got an up-going plantar...and then you do every single
test and you’ll ﬁnd that’s all negative...that’s the sort of
patient who I wouldn’t say has got a conversion disorder but
I’d say, well look, I don’t know what’s wrong with you...there
are one or two signs that I have difﬁculty to explain but...let’s
just wait and see. (S13)
Some made this distinction in part on the type of symptoms—
conversion presented with more ‘ﬂorid’ symptoms such as
paralysis, seizures or blindness. By contrast, the symptoms which
neurologists considered to have an undiscovered physical basis
tended to be ‘mild’, ‘normal’, ‘physiological’ occurrences over
which the patient had unnecessary concern—a sort of health
anxiety which the neurologist could readily understand:
How many times do I...wake up with a tingle here or a tingle
there...and you think, ‘‘Oh...there’s nothing majorly amiss’’,
while there are other people who will think, ‘‘Oh my god,
there’s something wrong...I need to go and see my
doctor’’...That’s not conversion disorder. (S14)
Well, some of their symptoms are probably organically based,
it’s just that the importance to which they attach them is
different...and I say it’s hard enough for me as a neurologist
to know whether the symptoms are going to be serious enough,
so how can we expect you to know...(S22)
Conversion symptoms were rather different, perhaps in terms of
the psychological construct (they were ‘psychogenic’), but also in
the degree of disability, the burden to the neurologist, or the way
they made the neurologist feel.
...the person who just keeps coming back to see you because
they’ve got this symptom and that symptom...I put them in a
different category because they are not...well, I suppose you
have to use the word ‘troublesome’...It’s all about how they
make me feel...(S17)
This feeling was associated with the patient’s illness behaviour,
which differed between the groups:
...the conversion disorder patients are just not happy with
[negative tests]...however many tests you do...they’re still
not satisﬁed...(S14)
...in a conversion disorder, it is not just about physical symp-
toms...there is a group of things that come together into dis-
tinctly abnormal behaviour...(S18)
In summary, there were various ways in which neurologists
deﬁned the conversion group within the range of unexplained
symptoms. They formed a group which was thought less likely
to have an underlying physical cause, which was more disabled,
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We might describe these collectively by saying they were more
severe. But the group was also associated with a psychological
formulation—a formulation other than ‘being anxious over
normal symptoms’.
The psychological formulation
The requirement for a psychological understanding was promi-
nently included, usually very early in the interview. Many began
with a conﬁdent statement of a position which closely echoed the
psychiatric criteria, and may be considered ‘textbook’:
...in essence physical symptoms of a psychological origin result-
ing from some kind of psychological distress which is expressed
through those physical symptoms for some indirect gain or even
direct gain on the part of the patient. The symptoms are not
under volitional control...(S01)
The ‘psychological understanding’ was described in various forms.
On the one hand it was seen as a background of distress
or personality difﬁculties which would provide a reason for
developing the disorder:
...there’s a background, something about the patient...
they’ve got stresses in their life or...the event came on after
some sort of [problem]...also what sort of person they are
too...if they’re a very anxious, stressed person...and also
obviously their...early upbringing...(S11)
On the other hand, it was also used to describe the transformative
process itself—the mechanism whereby problems result in a
physical presentation. So, there were appeals to psychological
constructs such as repression, conversion or dissociation:
The way I would see conversion disorders is that basically the
mechanisms that people use to keep whatever it is at bay have
failed...(S03)
...conversion disorder is a translation of...tensions in the
psyche presenting...as symptoms that are perceived as
genuine symptoms. (S22)
I suppose maybe it’s similar to being in a kind of dreamlike
state where you’re not concentrating on what you’re
doing...(S02)
But most would not go so far as to specify a mechanism. Many
would offer only a bare-bones model of psychological cause:
In terms of...what the causation is...I suppose I would rather
pharisaically put it as ‘psychological factors’...(S18)
And it was very common to describe the link as being in terms of
the ‘manifestation’ or ‘expression’ of psychological problems as
physical—terms which maintain a relationship between ground
and consequence while leaving the relationship unclear. Indeed,
there was often a statement of uncertainty at the core of the
neurologist’s response:
I don’t understand it. I imagine...here we’re just going into
speculation...I haven’t really thought about it...but I suppose
at a very crude level I imagine sort of that...I don’t know...it’s
at an unconscious level...(S05)
Well, I don’t really know...I can’t say...I suppose it’s...well I
suppose it’s maybe their way of dealing with problems they
can’t solve...(S11)
Though the neurologists thought the patient could perhaps be
understood psychologically, they did not see themselves as doing
so. Those who adduced the ‘textbook’ psychological model did not
expound their model in a more sustained way. Its advocates would
argue for it on the basis that it was what they had been told, or
taught, and it wasn’t necessarily their own view—even that it was
not really of their concern, as it was outside of their ﬁeld:
I don’t know, it’s what comes to my mind...it’s not my
particular clinical interest. (S19)
Though this was often presented as a limit imposed by the
exigencies of their practice:
I guess my role, as I often say to them, is I’m an electrician: I’ll
tell you about the hardwiring and I can try and tell you a little
bit about what I think about soft wiring...But you know it
takes a lot of discussion...which is not a luxury that we have
in our clinics. (S16)
I’m a neurologist so, much that I may ﬁnd the psychiatric symp-
toms interesting, it’s not my bag you know, because they’re an
enormous burden to my clinic. And so what I want to do is to
get them appropriate care...I don’t want to be doing amateur
psychotherapy on patients...(S22)
The major exception to this came from the neurologist who never
saw ‘conversion’ and doubted it existed. This doctor treated only
headache, but also had a well-developed explanatory and thera-
peutic (cognitive-behavioural) model in which they were actively
engaged. But for most, the neurologists’ involvement ended with
excluding ‘electrical’ explanations, they did not have the time or
the need to address the question of what did explain it—including
whether it might be explained by conscious behaviour:
I can’t help being intellectually curious about it. But on
an everyday level, no...I’m not sure it does matter...many
people can start with this notion of trying to sort this out - is it
conscious or otherwise - but...you soon forget about it when
you’re doing real neurology...(S17)
The distinction from feigning
Feigning was an almost unavoidable issue—all but two of the
neurologists brought it up, often under the rubric of ‘malingering’,
though a broader range of behaviours was probably intended.
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as part of the deﬁnition of conversion offered, as above, or as
a statement of conviction against a background of psychological
incomprehension:
I just cannot understand these people...from a psychological
point of view. I’ve got no idea. But I don’t think it’s
malingering. (S04)
I think in the majority of cases...the patients are not putting it
on...Whether there is any form of subconscious gain...I don’t
know. (S16)
The source of the conviction was difﬁcult to locate, however:
I suppose it’s just clinical intuition...(S06)
...sometimes it’s just a feeling...I can’t explain it better than
that. (S11)
Some would appeal explicitly to authority:
This is what we’ve been taught. (S05)
Or to the fact that the alternative was too awful to contemplate:
I think many of us would ﬁnd it...truly horrible to consider
that...patients who we see are putting it on for conscious
gain. (S18)
And a position of trust was held by some to be the only pragmatic
choice:
...my initial approach would always be to take at face value
what somebody is telling me in a clinical consultation...if I got
that wrong and I thought somebody was trying to mislead me
and they actually were not doing...that would...destroy any
relationship with that patient...and I would rather be naively
trusting than try to undermine what patients were telling me.
(S01)
But without raising the question, the neurologists sometimes
remained suspicious:
...the number of people I’ve seen over the years and I’ve
thought, ‘‘Is this person malingering? Are they putting it on for
my beneﬁt?’’ I have great difﬁculty sorting that one out. (S14)
In fact, most of the neurologists described the relationship
between feigning and conversion as difﬁcult to delineate clearly.
Commonly, this was because the two were conceived as being on
a continuum:
...there’s a spectrum which we could call abnormal illness
behaviour. On the one end is...ﬁctitious misbehaviour and on
the other end...are the people who misperceive symptoms as
being those of the disease...in the middle are those people
who create physical symptoms as a manifestation of their
psychological distress. (S13)
The conversion is not manipulation, supposedly; it’s not
somebody who is malingering, supposedly; though I ﬁnd it
very difﬁcult to draw the line very clearly between the
two...(S12)
And often when the neurologists described characteristic or
memorable conversion cases these cases would evince feigning
or conscious control:
...[a patient] was admitted with paraparesis which...seemed to
be exaggerated...the consultant got him to walk and he
crashed into some IV drip-stand and caused a great deal of
commotion and the consultant sort of told everyone just to
leave him there and he would get up, there was nothing
wrong with him. And he did. (S06)
...her main aim of coming to hospital is in a state which A&E
people in different places who haven’t seen her get very
concerned, and then she...tries to avoid any interaction from
us because we know the scenario...It may not be one hundred
percent [deliberate] but I think eighty percent...I would think
that’s truly a conversion...(S20)
There were some neurologists who found the distinction to be
relatively unimportant—not because it was clear and simple, but
because the distinction was (at least medically) irrelevant. So,
for example, it was argued that consciousness was a post facto
reconstruction, and not causally operative:
There is only the behaviour of the brain and part of that behav-
iour is to produce something that we call consciousness...to us
it feels like there is an ’I’...that is in control. Well, that’s prob-
ably not how it is at all...(S10)
Others argued that deception itself was pervasive, and therefore
not diagnostically helpful:
...insight changes from minute to minute; we’re all at times
insightful and at times we’re not insightful; we’re all at times
honest and dishonest. (S22)
It was even argued that deception would be more common in
conversion disorder precisely because the patient would strive to
convince the doctor of the reality of their problem—they might lie
to convince the doctor of the truth as they saw it:
...sometimes there is maybe conscious over-
exaggeration...[a patient] was very well walking on the arm
of her friend who was very supportive...but when I assessed
her on the couch it was much more difﬁcult: she wanted to
prove to me that she was really unwell. (S15)
And it was held by some that ultimately the distinction, though
important from other points of view, was not a medical issue:
I’d have to be a saint to say it didn’t alter my view of the
patient sometimes...but it shouldn’t do. It’s not your job to
make any sort of value judgement...(S10)
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have to do as a neurologist and if they have one over me,
well good for them - let the insurance company or the police
sort it out. (S17)
It is important to bear in mind that in being asked about ‘conver-
sion disorder’, a term perhaps more psychiatric than neurological,
the neurologists may have felt encouraged to speak more freely
about deception (and about psychogenesis) than if they had been
asked about, say, ‘functional disorders’. And their discussions may
have been subject to a social-desirability bias, as some of the
subjects will have known or guessed that the interviewer was
a psychiatrist. In an attempt to assess the latter, subjects were
asked to speculate on the views of the interviewer. Most insisted
that they had no idea: ‘I don’t know, you’ve been entirely bland,
I don’t know.’ (S05) But those who offered a guess at the inter-
viewer’s views did tend to say ‘the same as me’ (S13), or a more
ﬂattering version, such as ‘a slightly more sophisticated way of
what we’re saying’ (S06). And those who expressed a categorical
view said they thought the interviewer would take a biological
perspective: ‘I would guess that you have an organic model of
psychiatry’ (S22). Taken together, this does tend to suggest that
there was a signiﬁcant interviewer effect—however, it seems
that the effect would have generally been such as to discourage
explanations in terms of malingering, making the prominence of
such explanations in the interviews more striking still.
The problem of feigning
The neurologists we interviewed had a wide range of views on
conversion, many of them clearly reached after a great deal
of careful thought. They may have been an unusual group, of
course, being metropolitan to a degree, attached to an academic
unit, but also with comparatively ready access to neuropsychiatry.
We spoke with the majority of the neurologists in the region, and
our ‘snowball sampling’ should have helped us to capture the full
range of views. A sample collected and analysed in this way
cannot claim to accurately represent the frequency with which
views are held, but it does aim to robustly characterize the
conceptual spread.
The neurologists described a number of ways of understanding
‘conversion disorder’. Symptomatically, it was seen as a more
severe unexplained condition where a neuropathological explana-
tion was unlikely to be forthcoming; they also acknowledged that
there was probably a psychological explanation, but did not feel
this was their concern; and they also found the distinction
from feigning much less clear than the psychiatric manuals
would mandate, again without feeling this distinction was neces-
sarily important. This tells us that many neurologists like to see
their authority and responsibility ending when the neuropatholo-
gical explanation has been excluded: they can be ‘agnostic’ about
what other explanations are effective, whether these are psycho-
logical or social. This is an appealing position, supported by
both neurology (Hallett, 2006) and psychiatry (Miller, 1988).
The exclusion of organic pathology can be done effectively
(Stone et al., 2005), and the confusion about mechanisms left
to psychiatrists. But there are problems with this ‘agnostic’ stance.
Firstly, although this delimited role is appealing, it may not be
realistic: conversion may be considered a primary psychiatric dis-
order (by psychiatrists, at least), but it is managed largely by
neurologists (Mace and Trimble, 1991). This would seem to put
neurologists in the difﬁcult position of operating outside of their
perceived expertise. But there are several ways in which expertise
can be understood: it might reﬂect a particular understanding,
a therapeutic technique, or extensive experience. On the basis
of experience, neurologists could clearly claim considerably greater
expertise than psychiatrists. And, as described in the introduction,
the psychiatric claim to greater insight or therapeutic expertise is
also in question as psychoanalytic models continue to lose ground
within the profession. Neurological expertise may be importantly
different, but they are experts nonetheless.
Secondly, many of the neurologists are not simply ‘agnostic’,
they are avoidant: they believe or suspect feigning in many
cases, but do not, for a variety of reasons, pursue it (Kanaan
and Wessely, in press). While many acknowledged this freely,
there were others whose discussion suggested it—in giving
‘conversion’ examples which involved feigning, or in the ready
‘Freudian slips’ into such language as ‘ﬁctitious’ or ‘not real’
when speaking of their conversion patients’ symptoms.
Thirdly, neurologists making a judgement about origins would
explain what is otherwise puzzling about their division of the
unexplained. The neurologists had a hierarchy of the unexplained,
dividing them into those which could probably be explained
(if circumstances permitted) and those which could not possibly
be so in the current scheme. Thus ‘impossibility’ would seem to be
how conversion was identiﬁed. And saying a symptom was
‘impossible’ would seem to imply that there must be some kind
of different explanation, without saying what kind of explanation
that is—an agnostic position. But deciding that something is
impossible—that it is incommensurate with a scientiﬁc model—
cannot readily be done in practice: there are always further con-
ditions, further reﬁnements which can be made to accommodate
exceptions (Feyerabend, 1970). Consider the example most cited,
of the gross inconsistency between function on-and-off the exam-
ination couch. This is certainly odd, but not clearly impossible: it
merely requires an impairment which varies with the context, of
which there are multiple other examples from neurology. Some
additional, prior conception is required—something which argues
that this kind of inconsistency is different from the inconsistencies
that could be physically explained. That conception could be ‘mal-
ingering’—conscious control: the neurologist could compare the
symptoms with those that they might themselves consciously
adduce. The gross inconsistency of their patient would not be
impossible therefore, but it would be implausible: it would
be exactly what they would do if they were pretending to be
paralysed.
Of course, it is unlikely that our neurologists are approaching
this entirely as scientists; it is much more likely that they employ
various clinical heuristics and recognize certain patterns as
being those which predict a diagnosis of conversion. Conversion
patients are just those with particular patterns of symptoms,
of inconsistency, of disability, of illness behaviour, of how they
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cluster of negative features comes to be associated together, and
why is there this residual association with ‘malingering’, after 100
years of psychiatric orthodoxy saying otherwise?
There are three ways in which we might understand this.
First, that these are simply associated features of the disorder—
the neurologists are merely correctly identifying them. Patients
with conversion disorder have deceptive, behavioural or psycho-
logical characteristics that evoke these responses in people. They
are just unlucky enough to have a condition, a ‘natural kind’
(Kendell and Jablensky, 2003) that makes people dislike and
distrust them. But this does seem to objectify the dislikeable and
to blame the patient, so the alternative view has been that these
characteristics are actually features of the neurologist: patients
with conversion put the neurologist in the unwelcome position
of having to admit the limits of their competence, which the
neurologist projects onto their hapless patient as dislike. This
view updates a long tradition in hysteria revisionism, which has
sought explanations for hysteria in the broader relationships of
doctors with their patients—for example, in the historical reinter-
pretation of hysteria as misogyny (Micale, 1995). But it does not
explain why just these patients, of all the unexplained, should be
thought of in this way. The third view, the view we present here,
is somewhat different, and is in essence that ‘malingering’ is
actually the preferred model for the neurologists—it is the deﬁning
conception we searched for above, and any other pejorative
associations ﬂow from that.
This would argue that the neurologists are not agnostic after all:
that they know a great deal about conversion, and that deception
is the basis on which they understand it.
Deception as a model
Though psychological models were more widely endorsed, the
continued interest in ‘malingering’ was striking—albeit taking
subtle and varied forms. None of those interviewed took the
kind of absolutist position they recognized from their training,
the view that conversion was just malingering, that there was
nothing wrong with them. But deception remained a pervasive
issue, and a core diagnostic issue—either as a suspicion to be
combated, or as a reality to be accommodated. The contention
here is that deception is a pervasive issue because that is how at
least some neurologists understand their patients. Such an under-
standing may not be surprising. The neurologist has no available
neuropathological explanation. Deception of a trivial kind, in the
form of innocuous simulation, is part of the core encounter of the
conversion patient (Kanaan, in press): the patient presents with
what looks at ﬁrst like epilepsy or a stroke, but is not. The neu-
rologist can accept it as subconscious—and that was a possibility
they seemed willing to accept—but assessing that was described
as something only psychiatrists could do. Any model which would
have discriminatory power for the neurologist would have to be
something they could employ in their own clinical encounter. The
neurologist who doubted conversion existed is instructive here: as
they, uniquely, employed a psychological model in their practice,
they did not see conversion anywhere. The clearest evidence that,
for others, the model employed was deception, arose from those
instances when they brought up cases of ‘malingering’ as exam-
ples of ‘conversion’. They often corrected or modulated that sub-
sequently, but their ﬁrst thought, when reaching for a classic or
characteristic case, was to describe deception.
Holding to a heuristic model of deception would not imply that
they believed conversion patients to be consciously feigning.
Neurologists appear to accept the psychiatric orthodoxy that
there are subconscious qualiﬁcations of apparent feigning behav-
iour that make it something else. But it could function as a
heuristic nonetheless: the patient behaves ‘as though’ feigning,
but the painful business of deciding quite how that is explained
is someone else’s problem.
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